Keith Douglas
Last time we discussed the presuppositions of questions. Seanna and Alex both answered one of the questions. What does being able to answer the question say about its presuppositions? It appears the best way to put this is that the answer may “perpetuate” the presuppositions into the propositional realm or other aspects of language.
To show how this might work, I will go through the list by number (consult the previous column for the text) and discuss what I take to be a few of the prerequisites for each. I have not attempted to be exhaustive.
- That there could have been nothing. Note that this famous metaphysical question can thus be dismissed (like the “beating your dog” one) until that can be shown.
- That something occurred before; alternatively, that time “is” eternal to the past, that the big bang is in the past “everywhere” and quite a few other items. In general the matter of looking for presuppositions requires substantive knowledge in a domain of inquiry.
- That there are caged birds, that they sing, and arguably, that they sing for a reason. This question is, however, ambiguous between asking for a reason and asking for a cause and thus may have ambiguous presuppositions.
- I regard this as no different in style than item 3.
- There are in my view what might be called negative presuppositions here: that if there are immovable objects, there are therefore no such things as “irresistible” forces and vice versa. Since the question presupposes what it also denies, this is not a puzzle for more than about one second. However, it is interesting to think about whether there could be either but not both of the items in question, given our modern understanding of physics. You can presuppose that here.
- This presupposes infinity is a number (which it isn’t, in most set theories, or in its use in real analysis, etc.) and also that all numbers have a successor. This is also usually held in most mathematics but need not be.
- I trust this one was pretty clear: that Canada has a president. Someone might add also that Canada exists.
- I have a dictionary of quotations from my childhood days. Somewhere in it is the line “The only emperor is the emperor of ice cream.” Those who know Russell on definite descriptions might recognize this in another form: that there is an emperor, that there is exactly one, and that his subjects or people or scope of power is ice cream. The book is packed up right now and I cannot check where this is from. Since you can use a search engine as well as I, I leave it to you to investigate this weird quotation if you are interested.
- That colourless ideas exist, that green ideas exist, that green and colourless are compossible, and that ideas sleep.
- This one seems to presuppose that Jane used to write science fiction, but does not any longer.
- This one seems to presuppose that Jane used to write about even prime numbers greater than two, but does not any longer. Needless to say, in any reasonable number theory there are no such numbers. Does this matter? Consider someone writing fiction. Could one not write about non-standard (or even “impossible”) mathematics in that context?
- This one likely would be taken as having the presupposition of fiction as well, and in particular, to C. Schultz’ Peanuts comic strip. Notice here the context-relative nature of presuppositions, or at least some of them. One can then discuss presuppositions “in universe” as the fiction communities sometimes say.
- I don’t regard this one as any different from item 12.
- This one presupposes one can make or locate sufficiently pure uranium perxenate (not at all likely regardless of source!) and in sufficient quantities that it can be stirred, and also that it can exist stably at 50°C.
- As Alex hinted by spoiling the trick, that the clowns were in the car simultaneously. Note: Pedantically, it does not just presuppose that the clowns were in the car.
Continuing on our subject, then, for this month.
Presuppositions, Continued
I suggest that there are several types of presuppositions and that they need not attach to questions. But for the sake of avoiding complication I will stick with the questions theme. I will call some of them (with no indication that this list is exhaustive) ontological, epistemic, alethic, semantic, and ethical. The names are likely not too felicitous but we can refine as we go.
Ontological presuppositions are when something existing is presupposed. Epistemic ones are when something is presupposed to be known. Alethics are when something is presupposed to be true. Semantic is when something is presupposed to be meaningful. And ethical is when something is presupposed to be good. You can imagine other variations, perhaps. I have also not stated what the domain of the “somethings” are. This is vitally important, but I also leave it for you to think about. (Exercise 1: What would an aesthetic presupposition be? Exercise 2: What other sorts of ethical presuppositions might there be?)
As some of you may have heard, the contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett has just died (a day or so ago at the time of writing). This is sad for the world of philosophy and ideas. It’s sad for me, because he was a very important influence on my work, not only in philosophy but also as an educator and even as a cyber security professional. He will be missed. I will likely never again get to pick up a new Dennett offering. I say likely because it seems that being alive is not presupposed by publishing a book. (The eagle-eyed can see the semi-jokes here!) Carl Sagan’s The Varieties of Scientific Experience was published posthumously and after his “last book,” Billions and Billions.
Amazingly, however, this is “good timing” in a strange sort of way. Why? Because Dennett’s career involved a lot of pointing out presuppositions that might be questionable. It is not merely enough to show there are presuppositions, but also that they have to be analyzed sometimes. Here are a few questions from philosophy, neuroscience, evolution, etc., literatures that he tried to argue had some questionable presuppositions.
- Where in the brain does experience come together to happen?1
- Is this neural pathway afferent or efferent?2
- Does this machine recognize American or Costa Rican coins?3
- What colour was that thing?4
- What sort of thing are selves?5
- What is the architecture of mind? (Emphasis added to help show the point.)6
- How does intentionality apply at the sufficiently small scale?7
- How does one make an artificial person?8
I thus challenge you to consider these questions and to further challenge yourself by reading Dennett’s thought provoking work such matters. See you in June!
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Further Reading
- Consciousness Explained.
- Consciousness Explained.
- Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.
- Consciousness Explained. (See also his paper, “Real Patterns” for more.)
- Several of the papers in Brainchildren and all of Consciousness Explained.
- Most of what Dennett wrote has this as a theme. The “the” is vital to understanding why.
- The Intentional Stance.
- “The Problem with Counterfeit People,” one of Dennett’s most recent works.